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FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION: AN ETHICAL 
APPROACH TO PROPOSED REGULATORY CONTROL 
LISA MELANSONt 
Fetal tissue transplantation is garnering wide-spread attention as an effective 
treatment for debilitating illnesses like Parkinson s disease. At present, however, 
the unique ethical concerns raised by a consideration of this medical procedure 
have not been folly addressed in a comprehensive regulatory regime. As a result, 
the rights of all parties to the transplantation procedure-the pregnant woman, 
the aborted fetus, and the recipient of the fetal tissue-have, thus for, been in -
adequately protected. It is therefore imperative that controls be put in place to 
regulate the procurement and use of fetal tissue in a manner which is particu-
larly sensitive to the ethical issues associated with fetal tissue transplantation. A 
proposed statute which establishes strict requirements for consent and anonymity 
would largely eliminate the risks inherent in the transplantation procedure, 
while ensuring that the benefits of the procedure remain available to those pa-
tients awaiting fetal tissue t'ransplants. 
La grejfe des tissus des fa:tus comme traitement pour des maladies debilitantes 
attire beaucoup d'attention. Cependant, les problemes morals exceptionnels 
posies par la consideration de ce proct!de medical n 'ont pas jusqu 'ici ete adresses 
dans un regime rt!gulateur comprehensif. Par consequent, les droits de tous les 
interesses-la femme enceinte, le fa:tus avorte, et la personne qui reroit les 
tissus-ont ete mal proteges jusqu 'ici. fl fout done que des controles soient mises 
en place pour rt!glementer l'emploi et !'acquisition des tissus des fa:tus qui 
repondent aux questions morales posies par le procedt!. Une loi proposee qui 
t!tablit des exigences strictes concernant le consentement et l'anonymat 
eliminerait considerablement !es risques du proct!de, tout en assurant que les 
avantages du proct!de restent disponibles aux malades qui attendent la grejfe des 
tissus d'un fa:tus. 
t B.Sc. (Dalhousie), LLB. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). The author wishes to 
thank Heather Sanford for her helpful suggestions. 
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In the treatment of the sick person, the doctor must be 
free to use a new diagnostic and therapeutic measure, if in 
his or her judgment it offers hope of saving life, 
reestablishing health or alleviating suffering. 
The Declaration of Helsinki 
I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the 
time of conception; even under threat, I will not use my 
medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity. 
The Declaration of Geneva 
The transplantation of fetal tissue into adult recipients is an intensely-
debated medical procedure which is garnering increased attention. 
Although this procedure is currently being employed in a number of 
institutions world-wide, it raises serious ethical and legal concerns 
which have not yet been fully addressed. In particular, the paucity of 
legislation and jurisprudence relating to fetal tissue procurement and 
use has created a rather urgent need for law-makers to develop 
measures to regulate this burgeoning area of medical law. 
Consequently, in this paper, I will propose a legislative model for 
regulatory control of fetal tissue transplantation in Canada. 
In general, when our law-makers determine that a particular as-
pect of society requires regulation, there are numerous approaches 
which they may take in order to delineate legislation which will pro-
vide the requisite control. For example, legislative bodies may take an 
economic approach in drafting enactments, so as to promote certain 
economic interests, or to implement the government's economic 
policies. Alternatively, legislative drafters may pursue a more human 
rights-oriented approach, in an attempt to design legislation which 
will protect the rights of all members of the public. It is also possible, 
however, for law-makers to adopt an ethical stance to a particular 
matter requiring regulatory intervention, thereby transposing into 
explicit legislative terms the dominant ethical or moral view of the 
subject matter which society is currently promulgating. 
The subject matter of fetal tissue transplantation entails a juxta-
position of both legal and medical issues which warrant consideration 
in an ethical context. Social and moral attitudes toward invasive 
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medical procedures and the sanctity of human life must inevitably be 
considered in a discussion of fetal tissue transplantation. 
Furthermore, individuals' deeply-rooted religious and philosophical 
views of the status of the fetus are, of necessity, brought to the fore 
when considering the use of fetal tissue for transplantation purposes. 
Due to the contentious nature of fetal tissue transplantation, it is 
likely that any relevant legislation would be designed to address the 
unique ethical and moral problems raised by this procedure. Hence, 
it would be most appropriate if the formulators of legislation directed 
at regulating fetal tissue transplantation were to take an ethical ap-
proach to the task. It is only through an examination and analysis of 
the particular ethical issues raised by a discussion of fetal tissue 
transplantation that legislators can ensure that the interests of all in-
volved in the procedure will be protected, and that the inherent risks 
to the participants will be lessened or eliminated. 
Accordingly, this paper seeks to analyze the significant ethical and 
moral issues which must be addressed when considering the subject 
of fetal tissue transplantation. Taking this ethical approach to the 
matter, a legislative model for regulatory control of fetal tissue trans-
plantation will be proposed, which will reflect and, hopefully, allevi-
ate the distinctive ethical concerns raised by this promising medical 
procedure. 
I. MEDICAL USES OF HUMAN FETAL TISSUE 
1. Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
The use of human fetal tissue in transplantation therapy is not a new 
practice. As early as 1928, for example, attempts were made to trans-
plant fetal pancreatic cells into patients suffering from diabetes. 1 Fetal 
thymus transplantation to treat DiGeorge's syndrome is another 
primary application of fetal tissue transplantation which is currently 
in use.2 
1 M. C. Coutts, "Fetal Tissue Research" Scope Note 21, Georgetown University 
(Washington, D.C.: National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature, Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics, 1993) at 1. 
2 M. A. Mullen, "The Use of Human Embryos and Fetal Tissues: A Research 
Architecture" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Bacleground 
and Current Practice of Fetal Tissue and Embryo Research in Canada, vol. 15 
(Minister of Supply and Services Ottawa: Canada, 1993) at 16. 
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In addition to its initial historical contributions, there has re-
cently been rapid growth in the potential uses of fetal tissue trans-
plantation. New, secondary uses include the clinical treatment of 
such diseases as type-I diabetes (diabetes mellitus), and Parkinson's 
disease.3 Some potential tertiary applications of fetal tissue transplan-
tation include its use in treating leukemia, aplastic anemia, inherited 
metabolic storage disorders such as Tay-Sachs disease, and AIDS.4 
Parkinson's disease is one of the most common neurologic disor-
ders affecting people over fifty-five years of age. It results from the 
degeneration of dopamine-secreting cells in a portion of the mid-
brain. The cause of this progressive and irreversible condition is un-
known, and there are no treatments available that can stop or reverse 
the degeneration of cells. 5 Transplantation using adult tissue is not 
possible, because the process of transplantation damages mature brain 
cells, which do not regenerate and cannot be kept alive. 6 However, 
experiments have demonstrated that transplantation of an appropriate 
suspension of fetal brain tissue into the brains of Parkinson's patients 
can, in certain circumstances, restore normal brain function.7 It is 
believed that the dopamine-secreting fetal cells, which are selected 
from the brains of aborted fetuses, continue to produce dopamine in 
the brains of transplant recipients. The fetal cells may also encourage 
the recipient's own cells to produce dopamine. 8 
The use of fetal cells in Parkinson's patients is not yet a proven 
treatment,9 and very limited human studies are being conducted. As 
of 1993, the Victoria General Hospital in Halifax, Nova Scotia, was 
the only institution in Canada carrying out research using fetal tissue 
transplantation in human subjects. 10 The procedure followed by the 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. at 18-21. The final application which Mullen notes is plastic 
surgery/cosmetic treatment. This, however, is clearly beyond the ethical and 
justifiable scale of uses, in most cases. 
5 M. K. Elsom, "Fetal Tissue Transplants" (1992) 88 Can. Nurse 31at31. 
6 G. Morgan, "The Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation" (1991) 14 
U.N.S.W. L. J. 283 at 285-86. 
7 M. Elsom, supra note 5 at 31. 
8 D. Jones, "Halifax Hospital First in Canada to Proceed with Controversial 
Fetal-Tissue Transplant" (1992) 146:3 CMAJ 389 at 390. 
9 Supra note 2 at 15. 
IO Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: 
Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: 
Minister of Government Services, 1993) at 977. 
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Victoria General Hospital in instituting its fetal tissue research pro-
gram will be a point of reference later in this paper when the regula-
tion and control of fetal tissue procurement is discussed. 
The usual source of human fetal tissue for transplantation is first-
trimester abortions. 11 Fetal tissue is currently procured for research 
and therapeutic use from approximately one percent of all therapeutic 
abortions performed in Canadian hospitals, including the Victoria 
General Hospital. 12 Although the figures seem to suggest that the 
tissue available from therapeutic abortions would be more than suffi-
cient to accommodate the need for tissue for transplantation in the 
foreseeable future, 13 this assertion has been contested. Douglas 
Martin, for instance, states: 
Given approximately 90,000 first-trimester abortions in 
Canada annually, potentially there is enough usable 
aborted foetal tissue to support even an enthusiastic na-
tionwide research undertaking. However, if FTT [fetal tis-
sue transplantation] evolves into treatment, the number of 
Parkinson's disease and diabetes patients alone, for which 
FTT may be a therapeutic option, creates a tissue supply 
shortage. 14 
Consequently, we could reach a point in the future when our de-
mand for fetuses from therapeutic abortions might exceed the supply. 
2. Narrowing the Scope 
Fetal tissue transplantation represents a broad topic encompassing a 
multitude of sub-issues. This paper focuses solely on the issues sur-
rounding transplantation of tissue removed from dead fetuses (i.e., 
dead ex utero fetuses that have already been aborted by way of thera-
peutic abortion) .15 I will also assume the existence of a supply of fetal 
tissue from therapeutic abortions sufficient to meet any demand for 
fetal tissue. Finally, although fetal tissue transplantation is employed 
to improve the circumstances of certain patients (i.e., as a type of 
11 Supra note 2 at 7. 
12 Supra note 10 at 986. 
13 Ibid. at 989. 
14 D. K. Martin, "Foetal Tissue Transplantation Research: A Canadian Policy 
Analysis" (1992) 13 Health L. Can. 132 at 135. 
l5 Fetal tissue cells can remain in a suitable form for transplantation for up to 
several hours after an abortion, even though the fetus itself is incapable of 
maintaining a heart beat and respiration. Supra note 10 at 971. 
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treatment), it is not yet well-established in the health care system 
(and is therefore still viewed as an experimental procedure). Hence, I 
will not make any distinction between research and treatment in the 
following discussion of fetal tissue transplantation. 
II. ETHICALANALYSIS 
The ethics of fetal tissue transplantation can be considered from a 
number of different points of view. In the following analysis, the per-
ceived risks and benefits of fetal tissue transplantation will be as-
sessed, and the status of the fetus will be reviewed. These ethical is-
sues will then be evaluated in terms of the general principles of 
biomedical ethics. The conclusions reached in the ethical analysis can 
then form a theoretical framework around which proposed future 
legislation can be designed. The focus of the present analysis will be 
on the ethics of fetal tissue transplantation; therefore, the complex is-
sues relating to abortion will not be dealt with, except insofar as they 
are relevant to the discussion. 
1. Detrimental Aspects of Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
i. Increase in the Abortion Rate 
Many opponents of fetal tissue transplantation believe that induced 
abortion is morally wrong, and that the use of fetal tissue from thera-
peutic abortions legitimizes abortion. 16 Others contend that fetal 
tissue transplantation will encourage abortions which would not oth-
erwise occur. 17 They envisage a scenario where a pregnant woman, 
who is undecided about whether or not to have an abortion, proceeds 
with the abortion after learning that she can help another person by 
donating the resulting fetal tissue. Consequently, it is feared that the 
development of successful fetal tissue transplantation therapies might 
indirectly lead to an increase in the abortion rate. 
u. Commodification and Commercialization of Fetuses 
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell 
one's own body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the 
human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject 
16 Supra note 1 at 5. 
l7 ]. A. Robertson, "Rights, Symbolism, and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue 
Transplants" (1988) 18 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 5 at 6. 
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in any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial 
commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the pro-
fane. He asks much. 18 
79 
In addition to ethical concerns about fetal and maternal welfare, 
opponents of fetal tissue transplants have raised the spectre of a 
commercial market in fetal tissue. 19 A market in fetal tissue is prob-
lematic for at least three reasons. Firstly, allowing or encouraging the 
purchase of fetal tissue risks exploiting women and their reproductive 
capacities, especially since it is likely that the main suppliers of such 
tissue would be those who are poor. 20 Secondly, there is some concern 
that the existence of a market in fetal tissue, and non-altruistic 
financial motives, would provide an incentive to abort.21 Thirdly, 
paying women to abort, or to donate once they abort, along with the 
commercial buying and selling of fetal tissue and products made from 
fetal tissue, is generally perceived as damaging to human dignity. 22 As 
Christine Overall argues, the immorality of commercial exchanges in 
human fetal tissue stems from the fact that a person is not the sort of 
thing which may be bought or sold. Even if the fetus is not a person, 
it may eventually become one; therefore, it is not something which 
ought to be bargained with. 23 
iii. Coercion of Women 
There is some worry that pregnant women may be pressured into 
having an abortion by a physician, researcher, or sick family mem-
ber-through coercion or undue influence-in order to donate fetal 
tissue for transplantation. 24 It is also feared that a woman could first 
be coerced into becoming pregnant, and then coaxed into having an 
abortion to provide fetal cells for transplantation. 
18 Per Arabian, J. in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 271 Cal. 
Rptr. 146 (Cal. S.C. 1990) at 164. 
19 Supra note 5 at 31. 
20 Sipra note 17 at 10. 
21 A. Fine, "The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants" (1988) 18 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 
5 at 6-7. 
22 Supra note 17 at 10. 
23 C. Overall '"Pluck a Fetus from its Womb: A Critique of Current Attitudes 
Toward the Embryo/Fetus" (1986) 24 U.W.O.L. Rev. 1 at 9. 
24 D. Brahams, "Transplantation, the Fetus and the Law" (1988) 138 New L.J. 
91 at 91. 
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tv. Unnecessary Risk to the Pregnant Woman 
Although it is preferable to separate the moral issues and controversy 
surrounding therapeutic abortion from the use of fetal tissue for 
transplantation, it must be acknowledged that the type of abortion 
does affect the usability of the tissue in treatment. As stated by 
Dorothy Vawter et al.: 
Abortion and procurement procedures are sometimes al -
tered to increase the chances of obtaining certain types of 
fetal tissue. It is unknown whether such modifications in -
crease the risks of harm, discomfort, or inconvenience to 
women, or increase the chance that tissue is removed from 
living fetuses. It is also unknown whether women are in-
formed of the modifications that will be made if they con -
sent to donate fetal tissue. 25 
Thus, there is a fear that procurement of fetal tissue in a medically-
useful form could expose the pregnant woman to unnecessary risk.26 
Presently, suction curettage is the safest available procedure for ter-
minating pregnancies at the stage of fetal development optimal for 
tissue procurement. Since the supply of fetal tissue by this procedure 
currently exceeds the anticipated demand, there is no justification for 
exposing the mother to riskier procedures in order to obtain usable 
fetal tissue.27 However, in the future, for certain treatments, gestation 
may need to be prolonged, and the method of abortion may therefore 
need to be altered to increase the chances of therapeutic success for 
the recipient.28 
v. Unacceptable Risk to the Recipient of the Tissue 
It must also be recognized that fetal tissue transplantation is, at pre-
sent, an experimental procedure; therefore, an unsatisfactory outcome 
is possible. The grafts may be without effect, or their excessive growth 
could further compromise the recipient's own tissue function, 
thereby exacerbating symptoms. Infection or inflammation as a result 
of the surgery could also be fatal. 29 Any potential benefits of fetal 
25 D. E. Vawter et al., The Use of Human Fetal Tissue: Scientific, Ethical, and 
Policy Concerns (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1990) at 7. 
26 Supra note 21 at 5. 
27 Ibid. at 7. 
28 M. B. Mahowald, J. Silver & R. A. Ratcheson, "The Ethical Options in 
Transplanting Fetal Tissue" (1987) 17 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 9 at 13. 
29 Supra note 21 at 8. 
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tissue transplantation must therefore be weighed against the possibil-
ity that the treatment might not even work. 
vi. Brutalization of Medical Researchers 
Some authors see the use of aborted fetal tissue as the first step down 
a slippery slope leading to the creation of researchers without moral 
integrity and without concern for the dignity of the research subject 
or the dead fetus. In particular, Dr. Alan Fine, a key researcher into 
fetal tissue transplants at the Victoria General Hospital, is very con-
cerned with the empirical possibility that these procedures may bru-
talize those parties involved in carrying out the transplantations. 3o 
There is further concern that the transplantation process may even-
tually expand to include the transplantation of tissue from living, 
though nonviable, fetuses, or the transplantation of whole fetal 
brains.31 
2. Beneficial Aspects of Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
i. Therapeutic Use to Alleviate Human Suffering 
There are undeniable benefits which can be reaped from the use of 
fetal tissue in transplantation research and treatment. Proponents es-
pecially emphasize the long-awaited benefits for people suffering from 
incurable illnesses, such as Parkinson's disease. 32 Three main charac-
teristics of this disease support research into fetal tissue transplanta-
tion: the poor prognosis of patients under alternative treatments; the 
great clinical promise shown by research studies into fetal tissue 
transplantation;33 and the current lack of a satisfactory cure. 34 
ii. Potential Risks Not Substantiated 
The feared impact of fetal tissue transplantation on abortion practices 
and attitudes is actually highly speculative. 35 The main motivation for 
30 Ibid. at 6. 
31 Supra note 28 at 14. 
32 Supra note 1 at 5. 
33 Supra note 5 at 31. 
34 Supra note 21 at 5. 
35 In fact, any risk of an increased abortion rate, commercialization of fetal tissue, 
or coercion· of women has been unsubstantiated thus far in the Victoria General 
Hospital transplant program: Dr. J. V. Jones (former Chair, Victoria General 
Hospital Research Review Committee, 22 April 1994) [personal communication]. 
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abortion is the desire to avoid an unwanted pregnancy. The fact that 
fetal remains may be donated for transplant will continue to be of 
little significance in the total spectrum of factors which lead a 
pregnant woman to have an abortion. Having decided to abort, a 
woman may feel better if she then donates the fetal remains; yet, this 
does not prove that tissue donation will lead to a termination deci-
sion which would not otherwise have occurred.36 Furthermore, if a 
woman who aborts chooses to donate the fetal remains in the hope 
that some good might result from the abortion, then paying her to 
donate is unnecessary.37 In fact, assuming that the supply of fetal tis-
sue can readily meet the demand, it is not very likely that pregnant 
women will be asked to abort their fetuses for payment. Accordingly, 
the development of a market in fetal tissue, although serious, is only a 
mere possibility. Concerns regarding coercion of pregnant women are 
also less likely to materialize in situations where the supply of appro-
priate fetal tissue is sufficient to meet the demand. In fact, given the 
present availability of fetal tissue obtainable from therapeutic abor-
tions, it is unlikely that there will be increased pressure for women to 
donate fetal tissue for transplantation. 38 Finally, there is no indication 
thus far that fetal tissue transplantation desensitizes scientists, 
physicians, or nurses to the value of life. 39 
It appears, then, that the potential risks often associated with fetal 
tissue transplantation have not been substantiated, either in practice 
or in theory. Furthermore, fetal tissue transplantations which have 
been carried out to date have produced results which indicate that 
this procedure may prove to be very beneficial in the treatment of 
some debilitating illnesses, such as Parkinson's disease. Hence, in 
light of the proven benefits produced by fetal tissue transplantation, 
speculations on the presently unsubstantiated risks of this procedure 
do not represent a sufficient justification for an outright ban on fetal 
tissue transplantation. 
3. Status of the Fetus in Relation to the Mother 
Although the focus of this paper is not directed at the ethical impli-
cations of abortion, one aspect of the abortion debate is necessarily 
relevant to the present discussion: the status of the fetus. It is essential 
36 Supra note 17 at 6-7. 
37 Ibid. at 10. 
38 Supra note 10 at 999. 
39 Supra note 21 at 6. 
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to clarify this issue, as it will ultimately determine, in most cases, 
one's feelings toward the ethical and legal issues relating to fetal tissue 
transplantation. However, as the scope of this paper extends only to 
those ethical issues relating to the use of fetal tissue obtained from 
dead fetuses which have been therapeutically aborted, those aspects of 
the abortion debate which centre on the status of the in utero fetus 
will be of only marginal relevance to the present discussion. 40 
Currently, in Canada, the status of the fetus and the mother is 
unsettled. 41 Recent case law indicates, however, that a fetus is not a 
person until it issues from the mother.42 There are three main ethical 
frameworks which specifically consider the status of the dead fetus. 
Each of these frameworks is relevant to an analysis of the ethics of 
fetal tissue transplantation.43 
i. The Dead Fetus as Human Research Subject 
The first ethical framework views the dead ex utero fetus as a human 
research subject in its own right. As a result, the dead fetus is ac-
corded its own status, independent from its mother; therefore, it de-
serves to be treated with a degree of dignity comparable to that 
shown to all other deceased human research subjects. Most oppo-
nents of abortion similarly consider the in utero or ex utero fetus as 
having a status completely independent from its mother. According 
to this conservative perspective, the fetus is in most, if not all, fun-
damental respects like any other human. Even though actual person-
hood is not fixed until birth, the humanity of the fetus, according to 
this point of view, should not be overlooked. 44 
It is not surprising, then, that the ethical framework which views 
the dead fetus as a human research subject is often supported by those 
who oppose abortion. Both perspectives view the fetus as an entity 
4o For a consideration of the status of the in utero fetus in Canada, specifically in 
relation to the abortion issue, see M. L. McConnell, "Sui Generis: The Legal 
Nature of the Foetus in Canada" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 548; S. A. Tateishi, 
"Apprehending the Fetus En Ventre Sa Mere: A Study of Judicial Sleight of Hand" 
(1989) 53 Sask. L. Rev. 113; and C. Talton, "Medicolegal Implications of 
Constitutional Status for the Unborn: 'Ambulatory Chalices' or 'Priorities and 
Aspirations"' (1988-89) 47 U. T. Fae. L. Rev. 1. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See, e.g., R. v. Sullivan and Lemay (1991), 122 N.R. 166 (S.C.C.). 
43 Supra note 25 at 211. 
44 C. M. Meechan, "Fetal Experimentation: Protocols, Propriety and 
Parameters" (1985-86) 11 Queen's L. J. 166 at 174. 
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independent from its mother. Hence, both positions advocate, on 
behalf of the fetus, that the dignity of the dead fetus should be ac-
corded the same protection as that granted to other independent hu-
man research subjects. 
A positive feature of this first ethical framework is that it requires 
special review by an interdisciplinary group of persons interested in 
minimizing risks and obtaining informed consent. 45 This protocol is 
necessary if the dead fetus is to receive treatment comparable to that 
provided to other human research subjects. A proxy decision-maker 
must consent, on behalf of the fetus, to the procurement of fetal tis-
sue for transplantation. The proxy is required to base his or her deci-
sion either on the basis of what the dead fetus would have wanted, or 
on some view of what is in the dead fetus' best interest. 46 It is ex-
tremely difficult to see how any proxy decision-maker could rely on 
either of these ethical standards in forming his or her decision. 
Furthermore, proponents of this ethical framework hold that parents, 
who normally serve as proxy decision-makers for fetuses involved in 
research, abdicate their right to make a decision on behalf of the fetus 
once they decide to abort. For example, Kathleen Nolan argues: 
It would in general seem desirable to disqualify anyone 
having agency in another's death from then serving as a 
proxy for the purpose of making a donation. To participate 
in another's death is ultimately to objectify that other, to 
use the other for purposes not of his or her own. Thus, 
even if one believes elective abortion can be ethically justi -
fied (in general, or in specific cases), maternal consent-or 
indeed, societal consent-to donation still generates mis-
givings.47 
Proponents of this view therefore conclude that all fetal tissue trans-
plantation should be prohibited, as it is not possible to find anyone 
who can formulate a proper decision on behalf of the dead fetus, and 
who can rightfully serve as proxy decision-maker. 
Critics of this framework maintain that the ethics of conducting 
research on a living fetus are not the same as the ethics of conducting 
research involving a dead fetus or its tissue. Never having walked, or 
talked, or interacted with others as an individual, an aborted fetus is 
45 Supra note 25 at 227. 
46 Ibid. at 213. 
47 K. Nolan, "Genug ist Genug: A Fetus is Not a Kidney" (1988) 18:6 Hast. 
Cent. Rpr. 13 at 14. 
FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION 85 
not identical in status to a cadaver. 48 It is argued that dead fetuses 
cannot be physically or emotionally harmed, and cannot be wronged 
by being the subject of research. However, the pregnant woman un-
dergoing an abortion, who subsequently donates the resulting fetal 
tissue, could be potentially subjected to both physical and emotional 
harm. Hence, the woman from whom the fetal tissue is removed 
should be viewed as the human research subject in need of protec-
tion, and not the dead fetus. 49 I concur with these critics that the 
possibility that the pregnant woman might suffer actual harm re-
quires that we elevate her status above that of the dead, aborted fetus 
which cannot be physically or emotionally harmed. 
Critics also see serious flaws in the argument that a woman who 
elects to have an abortion should be disqualified from making a sur-
rogate decision on behalf of the fetus whose life she has terminated. 
Firstly, deceased persons or fetuses no longer have interests to be pro-
tected, as the notion of proxy implies. Secondly, it is contended (and 
rightfully so) that it is a mistake to assume that a woman has no in-
terest in what happens to the fetus which she chooses to abort. 5o Each 
woman has her own compelling reasons for choosing to terminate her 
pregnancy, and she may care deeply about whether fetal remains are 
contributed to research or therapy to help others. For instance, a 
pregnant woman may choose to discontinue her pregnancy because it 
poses a serious threat to her life or health. The circumstances of each 
woman are different, and we should not shroud the decision with 
blanket assumptions which might be totally inaccurate and 
misdirected. 
ii. The Dead Fetus as a Cadaveric Organ Donor 
There is a well-established legal and ethical tradition which provides 
each person with the autonomous right to control the disposition of 
his or her bodily remains after death. This right is formalized in our 
provincial human tissue gift legislation.51 Such legislation requires 
that consent be obtained prior to any use of the body or its parts in 
medical research or therapy. Such legislation also generally allows for 
48 J.M. Hillebrecht, "Regulating the Clinical Uses of Fetal Tissue" (1989) 10 J. 
Leg. Med. 269 at 283. 
49 Supra note 25 at 213-14. 
50 Supra note 17 at 9. 
5! See, for example, Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 215, as am. S.N.S. 
1991, c. 13. 
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the disposition of remains by family members when there has been 
no direct indication of the deceased' s opposition to such a donation. 
Those who view the dead fetus as a cadaveric organ donor argue 
that fetal tissue may be dealt with according to such human tissue gift 
legislation. Adopting this framework would mean that either parent 
of the dead fetus would have decision-malcing power regarding dona-
tion; the decision whether or not to donate fetal tissue would not be 
the prerogative of the woman alone. 52 However, those who reject this 
view of the status of the dead fetus argue that the mother is the 
subject whose rights need to be protected; hence, the father or sperm 
source should not have decision-malcing power, or indeed any role, in 
the consent process relating to the procurement of tissue from an 
aborted fetus. There is also a concern that a woman could feel co-
erced, or have a new incentive, to abort a fetus she would not other-
wise abort if the father retained his decision-malcing power. 53 
iii. The Dead Fetus as a Tissue Specimen of the Mother 
At the liberal end of the ethical spectrum lies the viewpoint which re-
gards the dead fetus as a tissue specimen from the mother.5 4 
Proponents of this view contend that the issue of consent is 
paramount in the procurement of fetal tissue for transplantation. It is 
the consent of the mother on her own behalf, and not as proxy for 
the fetus, which must be obtained before the fetal tissue may be pro-
cured for use in transplantation. The father does not retain any right 
to veto the procurement of the fetal tissue.55 
In addition, it is customary in medical practice for fetal remains, 
post-abortion, to have the same moral status as that accorded any 
other specimen removed from a woman during surgery. 56 This lends 
support to proponents of this ethical framework who view the dead 
fetus as a tissue specimen of the mother. The existence of potential 
harm to the pregnant woman during the procurement process, and 
the absence of potential harm to the dead fetus, also support this 
ethical viewpoint. 
Opponents of this framework object to viewing the fetus as a tis-
sue specimen of the mother. They assert that the fetus is not merely a 
52 Supra note 25 at 216-17. 
53 Ibid. at 228. 
54 Supra note 44 at 17 4. 
55 Supra note 25 at 224. 
56 Ibid. 
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mass of cells which form a part of a pregnant woman's body, but is a 
separate human being with its own gender and genetic identity.57 
Kathleen Nolan, for example, states that "[t]reating fetal cadavers un-
der a model that approximates routine salvage cannot help but depre-
ciate and objectify them"; 58 a "fetus isn't a kidney, even when we act 
as if it is . . . . " 59 
Opponents also point to the decision in the case of Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California 60 in support of their position. In 
that case, physicians used Moore's spleen, which had been surgically 
removed, to develop a profitable cell line. The physicians did not 
inform Moore that they intended to use the spleen cells for this 
purpose. The Supreme Court of California found that the physicians 
had breached their fiduciary duty in neglecting ro disclose personal 
interests unrelated to the patient's health, and in failing to obtain 
Moore's informed consent. 
Although the findings in Moore are not binding on Canadian 
courts, the reasoning in this case does suggest that legal thinking in 
matters relating to tissue removal may be changing. In particular, the 
Moore decision has arguably weakened the common law presumption 
that when a patient enters a hospital, he or she implicitly abandons to 
science any tissues removed during surgery.61 
In the present context, the Moore case suggests that, at a mini-
mum, the potential to treat specimens as property might require re-
searchers to seek explicit consent from the mother, should they desire 
to use fetal tissue for transplantation. At a maximum, researchers may 
have to share with the mother any profits made from the manufac-
ture of products using fetal cells.62 Consequently, there is a fear that if 
a dead fetus is viewed as being a tissue specimen, or property of the 
mother, then women could be provided with new financial induce-
ments to abort, or to become pregnant for the purpose of aborting 
57 Ibid. at 226. 
58 Supra note 47 at 17. 
59 Ibid. at 19. 
60 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. C.A. 1990). 
61 Supra note 10 at 991. 
62 For further implications of the Moore decision, see B. Hoffmaster, "Between 
the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the Moore Case" 
(1992-93) 7 I. P. J. 115, and R. W. Marusyk & M. S. Swain, "A Question of 
Property Rights in the Human Body" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 351. 
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the fetus and donating the resulting tissue. 63 Nevertheless, it is this 
framework which has dominated fetal tissue procurement. 64 
As indicated earlier, the pregnant woman, and not the dead fetus, 
may potentially be harmed, either physically or emotionally, by the 
procurement of fetal tissue. As well, the pregnant woman, and not 
the dead fetus, is accorded certain rights at law. Each of these views is 
consistent with the third ethical framework, which requires that the 
mother's consent be obtained before fetal tissue is procured, and 
which denies the dead fetus any moral or legal status above that of all 
other tissue specimens removed from the mother. Thus, I think it is 
appropriate that the tissue from a dead, aborted fetus be viewed as a 
tissue specimen from the mother's body. 
4. Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
In their text, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 65 Beauchamp and 
Childress adopt a deontological perspective of biomedical ethics, and 
set out four primary rules according to which acts or decisions in the 
biomedical field may be judged. These four principles are: autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. The preceding ethical anal-
ysis will now be considered in light of these four principles. 
Autonomy is generally viewed as the primary principle which 
cannot easily be overridden by the other three principles. Unlike 
many contentious issues, however, the principles of beneficence and 
autonomy are not directly in conflict here, because it is not univer-
sally-accepted that fetal tissue transplantation is a beneficial and so-
cially acceptable form of treatment. As well, the benefits of such 
treatment do not directly accrue to the parties who might be required 
to consent to the donation of fetal tissue-the mother and/or the fe-
tus. Hence, the benefits and risks of the procedure are initially 
weighed in order to determine if fetal tissue transplantation is inher-
ently beneficial. Concluding that such transplantation should occur, 
the principle of autonomy (and its requisite consent) is discussed, 
followed by a review of relevant justice issues. 
63 Unril either legislators or courts address issues such as those in Moore, the 
Canadian position in this area will remain unclear: Marusyk & Swain, supra note 
62. 
64 Supra note 25 at 228. 
65 T. L. Beauchamp & ]. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3d ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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i. Beneficence 
The principle of beneficence reflects an obligation to actively confer 
benefits, and to balance the possible benefits against the possible risks 
of a procedure. 66 The main positive aspect of fetal tissue transplan-
tation-the treatment of persons with debilitating and incurable dis-
eases-weighs heavily in favour of such a medical procedure. The 
treatment does appear to be successful in many instances, and, thus 
far, there do not appear to be any serious side effects. Furthermore, 
there are currently no other alternatives to the treatment of serious 
neurologic disorders like Parkinson's disease. 67 The lack of other 
treatment options therefore increases the intrinsic beneficial value of 
fetal tissue transplantation. 
It is evident, then, that fetal tissue transplantation can make a 
difference in certain patients, especially those with Parkinson's dis-
ease. Thus, unless the risks dramatically outweigh the benefits of this 
treatment, fetal tissue transplantation should be pursued. The possi-
bility of benefit to persons suffering from disease suggests that there is 
an ethical obligation to proceed with such treatment, providing that 
it can be done without harm to others. 
ii. Nonmaleficence 
The principle of nonmaleficence reflects an obligation of non-inflic-
tion of harm. 68 In terms of fetal tissue transplantations, there are a 
number of parties who might be harmed by this medical procedure, 
including future fetuses, the pregnant woman, the recipient of the tis-
sue, and researchers. It is essential that researchers and physicians en-
sure that they are not inflicting unnecessary harm on any of these 
parties before the procedure should be promoted. The fetus whose 
tissues are actually procured cannot be harmed in the context of this 
discussion, as I am focusing solely on the use of tissue taken from a 
dead fetus which has already been aborted. 69 
It is conceivable that harm to future fetuses might arise under the 
guise of an increase in the abortion rate, possibly coupled with the 
66 Ibid. at 195. 
67 Supra note 21 at 7. 
68 Supra note 65 at 120. 
69 Some, of course, would argue that the dignity of the dead fetus, as a potential 
human being, may still be harmed by tissue transplantation. However, as I have 
adopted the position that the status of the dead fetus is equivalent to that of the 
mother's tissue specimens, the conservative view of the dead fetus is not persuasive. 
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commodification and commercialization of fetal tissue, or coercion of 
an undecided mother into having an abortion. However, it has been 
noted that these fears are perhaps exaggerated. Furthermore, it is 
quite possible to mitigate any of these nebulous risks through proper 
legislation or regulation. For instance, a complete prohibition on the 
sale of fetal tissues and products made from fetal tissue, and on the 
payment to women from whom the tissue is obtained, can ensure 
that commodification and commercialization of fetal tissue do not 
occur. 70 It has also been suggested that any discussion of the use of 
fetal tissue for research should be deferred until after the woman gives 
informed consent to the abortion.71 This can help prevent coercion of 
the pregnant woman, and ensure that tissue donation does not lead 
to a termination decision which would not otherwise have occurred. 
Coercion can also be diminished through a prohibition on designa-
tion of the fetal tissue recipient. 72 
Similarly, any physical risk to the pregnant woman or to the 
eventual recipient of the fetal tissue can be lessened or alleviated by 
requiring voluntary, informed consent from both parties.73 If the re-
searchers and physicians fully disclose to both the pregnant woman 
and the tissue recipient the potential risks of the procedure, and allow 
these individuals the freedom to make their own decisions, then the 
voluntary choices of these autonomous patients cannot be ques-
tioned. Finally, it has been suggested that harm might come to re-
searchers involved in fetal tissue transplants, in the form of brutaliza-
tion. This, again, is a rather elusive fear, and has not yet been sub-
stantiated. 74 
Taken as a whole, then, the obligation upon physicians and re-
searchers not to inflict harm is trumped by the benefit conferred 
upon seriously ill patients by the process of fetal tissue transplanta-
tion. The existence of alternatives or safeguards to alleviate the risks, 
and the current absence of alternative treatments to assist sufferers of 
chronic disorders, justify the introduction of fetal tissue transplanta-
tion into the Canadian health care system. It must now be deter-
mined what consent, if any, is required before fetal tissue may be pro-
cured, and from whom consent should be obtained. 
70 Supra note 10 at 1002. 
71 Ibid. at 997. 
72 Ibid. at 999. 
73 Supra note 21 at 7-8. 
74 Supra note 21 at 6. 
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iii. Autonomy 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, the principle of autonomy 
encompasses a number of requirements, including the right to refuse 
treatment, the right to consent to treatment, the right to have full in-
formation so that autonomous decision-making can be fostered, and 
avoidance of coercion. 75 In the context of fetal tissue transplants, the 
issue of consent is most relevant. One's view of the status of the fetus 
ultimately dictates which party should be providing consent to the 
procedure, and on whose behalf the consent is given. 
If the status of the fetus is equated with that of other tissues in 
the mother's body, it is dear that only the mother's consent is rele-
vant to a determination of the eventual disposition of the fetal tissue. 
There is no decision-making role for the father within this ethical 
framework.76 Furthermore, the mother is providing this consent on 
her own behalf; her consent is not given as a surrogate decision on 
behalf of the dead fetus. What degree of consent is required before 
fetal tissue may be procured for the purposes of transplantation? 
Assuming the pregnant woman retains the right to determine 
whether fetal tissue is used for transplantation, the main ethical goal 
is to ensure that her choice about the abortion, and her decision re-
garding tissue donation, are both "free and informed."77 Firstly, the 
woman must be fully informed of the use to which the fetal tissue 
may be put. Secondly, it is essential that there be a dear separation of 
the decision to abort and the decision to donate, so that tissue dona-
tion is not seen as a prerequisite to the performance of an abortion. 
This will reduce the chances that the pregnant woman will be coerced 
into either obtaining an abortion, or donating the resulting fetal tis-
sue. In addition, the physician performing the abortion, and the per-
son requesting consent to tissue donation, should not be involved in 
the subsequent tissue procurement and transplantation procedures, a 
constraint widely followed in cadaveric organ procurement.78 This 
can also serve to counteract any opportunities for coercion, and thus 
ensure that the pregnant woman makes a fully autonomous choice. 
75 Supra note 65 at 73. 
76 The position of the father or sperm source is relevant to the decision whether 
or not to abort, and has formed the basis of many Supreme Court of Canada 
rulings on abortion: See, e.g., Tremb!dyv. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530. 
77 Supra note 17 at 9. 
78 Supra note 17 at 9. 
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If there is a dear separation between the decision to abort and the 
decision to donate, researchers would be unable to alter the type of 
abortion which a woman will undergo, as there would be no mention 
of the procurement of fetal tissue until after the abortion consent 
form has been signed. Consequently, the researchers and physicians 
will have to be satisfied with the gestational age of the fetuses which 
are produced, and the quality of the tissue provided. They will there-
fore be unable to request that the pregnant woman undergo a certain 
type of abortion procedure which might expose her to unnecessary 
risks. However, assuming that the supply of usable fetal tissue is ade-
quate to meet the demand, the possibility that a woman may be asked 
to undergo a more dangerous type of abortion is virtually eliminated. 
iv. justice 
The principle of justice is generally perceived in terms of fairness and 
claims of entitlement.79 Although this paper assumes a constant 
supply of fetal tissue sufficient to meet the demand, problems of dis-
tributive justice, and allocation of public resources, might arise under 
conditions of scarcity of fetal tissue. Absent any current regulatory 
mandate, there is a potential for development of a demand for fetal 
tissue which exceeds the supply. It is therefore necessary to put into 
place restrictions which ensure that the health of the mother remains 
the paramount concern, and that scarce fetal tissue is not procured at 
any cost. It is also necessary to take into consideration the potential 
for the development of a bio-commerce in scarce fetal tissue. A fetus 
is, arguably, a "regenerative" tissue, as it can, in general, be created at 
will; thus, it is particularly suited to commodification. The principle 
of distributive justice requires that scarce resources be allocated to 
those who need these resources the most-not necessarily to those 
with the greatest financial means. Therefore, regulations must be put 
in place to prohibit both the sale of fetal tissue and products made 
from fetal tissue, and the payment of women in exchange for aborted 
fetal tissue. 
Given the controversial nature of the use of aborted fetal tissue, 
allocation of public funds to such research is presently unlikely. 
Although legislators have not prohibited fetal tissue transplantation 
thus far, conscious ignorance is not an adequate response to the issue. 
Fetal tissue transplantation therapy is still a last resort for patients 
79 Supra note 65 at 257. 
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who have not responded to, or have rejected, alternative treatments. 
Yet, it is still a valid concern that treatments dependent on a supply 
of fetal tissue may become the primary method for treating a particu-
lar disease, to the exclusion of standard treatments. It is therefore es-
sential that future legislators remain cognizant of the potential uses of 
fetal tissue in transplantation in order to accurately assess the alloca-
tion of public funding, and to ensure a just distribution of limited re-
sources. 
III. CURRENT AND PROPOSED REGULATORY 
CONTROLS 
It is dear from the ethical concerns raised in the previous discussion 
that some standards are needed to regulate fetal tissue transplanta-
tion. The following legal analysis will initially consider what regula-
tion currently exists. The adaptability of present regulatory controls 
will then be evaluated to determine if they are sufficient to deal with 
the ethical problems created by fetal tissue transplantation. 
Legislation enacted in jurisdictions other than Canada will be re-
viewed briefly, in order to gain some insight into the potential for 
legislative regulation in the area of fetal tissue transplantation. Finally, 
in employing and implementing the ethical requirements set out in 
the ethical analysis, the type of law needed to regulate fetal tissue 
transplantation will be proposed. 
1. Current Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
The procurement and use of fetal tissue is not currently regulated in a 
comprehensive manner by any level of government in Canada. Thus, 
guidance must be taken from existing provincial human tissue gift 
legislation, provincial health legislation regulating the disposal of 
abandoned tissues, national guidelines for research involving human 
subjects, and internal policy guidelines established in institutions 
where abortions and/ or procurement of fetal tissue tal<:e place. 
i. Human Tissue Gift Legislation 
Currently, human organs and tissues are acquired and utilized 
according to provincial legislation, such as the Nova Scotia Human 
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Tissue Gift Act.80 Statutes of this kind attempt to ensure that existing 
rights are recognized; appropriate consent is obtained; the sale of 
human tissues is prohibited; and anonymous, equitable distribution 
occurs. Such legislation does not specifically include fetal tissue. 
However, in the Manitoba and Prince Edward Island legislation, 
fetuses are specifically excluded from the definition of "tissue."81 
ii. Provincial Health Legislation 
Regulations enacted under existing Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
hospital legislation do, however, refer to tissues removed from a pa-
tient during the curettage procedure. 82 These regulations generally 
provide for the disposal of fetal tissue in a manner similar to that used 
for other abandoned tissues. Nevertheless, neither regulation consid-
ers the actual procurement and use of fetal tissue for transplantation 
purposes. Hence, there is a gap in the legislation relating to this area. 
iii. National Research Guidelines 
The Medical Research Council of Canada (MRC) is a pseudo-govern-
mental agency which regulates funding for medical research. This or-
ganization is viewed as a "special interest group," and is comprised of 
basic scientists and physicians who have professional interests in med-
ical research. 83 In 1987, the MRC issued a set of guidelines that apply 
to the conduct of medical research. Compliance with these guidelines 
is necessary where the research is funded by the federal government.84 
Under the heading of "Research on Fetuses," the MRC Guidelines 
state: 
Separated tissue and placental material may be regarded as 
routine pathological tissue, and may be used in research, 
subject to the permission of the mother whenever possible 
80 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 215, as am. 1991, c. 13; see also Human Tissue Act, 
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-12, as am. S.N.S. 1984, c. 25; S.N.S. 1986, c. 44; S.N.S. 
1990, c. 61; S.N.S. 1992, c. 52, and the Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. H-20. 
81 See Human Tissue Act, S.M. 1987-88, c. 39, s. 1 and Human Tissue Donation 
Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1992, c. 34, s. l(g). 
82 See N.S. Reg. 16/79 enacted pursuant to Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208, 
s. 17, and N.B. Reg. 92-84, s. 45, enacted pursuant to Hospital Act, S.N.B. 1992, 
c. H-6.1, as am. S.N.B. 1992, c. 52. 
83 Supra note 14 at 138. 
84 Supra note 10 at 993. 
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and to provincial human-tissue-gift legislation and hospital 
regulations. 85 
95 
This might suggest that the procurement and use of tissue obtained 
from a dead, aborted fetus is acceptable according to Canadian policy 
standards. 
iv. Institutional Policy Guidelines 
At present, in the absence of any mandated consent processes, each 
individual institution involved in fetal tissue transplantation must as-
sess for itself the ethical issues relevant to the procedures, and moni-
tor itself accordingly. Any need for obtaining informed consent to the 
procurement and use of fetal tissue will be determined by the internal 
ethics committee's views on the status of the dead fetus. However, by 
convention, these institutions generally look to the MRC Guidelines 
for guidance. There are no other published guidelines for human 
biomedical research in Canada; thus, the use of the MRC Guidelines 
does not necessarily reflect a voluntary decision on the part of these 
institutions. 86 
To date, it appears that the Victoria General Hospital is the only 
hospital in Canada which has approved an internal policy relating to 
the procurement and use of fetal tissue.87 According to Dr. J. V. 
Jones, 88 former Chair of the Victoria General Research Review 
Committee, a woman must provide voluntary, informed consent be-
fore she can obtain an abortion. After her consent has been given to 
the abortion procedure, the pregnant woman is then asked if she can 
be approached by someone responsible for obtaining consent with re-
spect to the procurement of fetal tissue. If the woman agrees, she is 
approached by that individual (who is not one of the researchers or 
physicians involved in the transplant procedure), and asked if she will 
consent to the use of the aborted fetal tissue in a transplantation ex -
periment. The woman is made aware of the details of the transplan-
tation procedure, and is in no way pressured to give her consent. If 
the woman consents to the procurement of the fetal tissue, she is then 
asked to sign a second, separate consent form, which has been ap-
proved by the Research Review Committee. Thus, the cornerstone of 
85 Medical Research Council of Canada, Guidelines on Research Involving Human 
Subjects (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987) at 32. 
86 Supra note 14 at 133. 
87 Supra note 14 at 133. 
88 Personal communication, (22 April 1994). 
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the Victoria General Hospital procurement process is the free and 
informed consent of the pregnant woman, obtained subsequent to, 
and separate from, the consent to an abortion. 
2. Adaptability of Existing Regulatory Controls 
The present human tissue gift legislation balances the rights of an 
individual over his or her body with the potential benefit to others 
conferred by either inter vivos or post-mortem donations of organs 
and tissues. Although fetal tissue is not specifically included in this 
legislative scheme, it could be argued that, by analogy, the intentions 
of the legislation must be deemed to apply to fetal tissue transplanta-
tion. This interpretation would at least ensure that some measure of 
consent to the use of fetal tissue is obtained from a pregnant woman 
who is about to undergo an abortion. 
However, the distinction between inter vivos and post-mortem 
donations becomes confused when applied to the situation of a living 
mother donating tissue obtained from a dead fetus. If the procure-
ment of tissue from a dead fetus is deemed to be a post-mortem do-
nation, then the legislation allows persons other than the mother to 
consent to the use of the tissue. Yet, I have chosen to view the status 
of a dead fetus as being equivalent to that of a tissue specimen taken 
from the mother; therefore, only the mother should be able to pro-
vide consent to the procurement of fetal tissue. Can the donation 
therefore be considered an inter vivos gift? The answer to this ques-
tion is not clear, and there is no indication in the legislation as to 
which type of donation would best accommodate the procurement of 
tissue from a dead fetus. 
Even if human tissue gift legislation could be adapted for fetal tis-
sue transplantation, there is no provision to protect against coercion 
of a pregnant woman, nor does the legislative scheme address any of 
the other unique and complicated issues presented by the use of fetal 
tissue. Furthermore, as D. K. Martin suggests, human tissue gift legis-
lation applies only to persons;89 since the Supreme Court of Canada 
and relevant case law have indicated that a fetus is not a person,9° the 
legislation should not apply directly to the fetus, and might not apply 
to surrogate consent by the mother on the fetus' behalf. Finally, any 
modification of this legislation would require a considerable number 
89 Supra note 14 at 132-33. 
90 See for example, McConnell, supra note 40. 
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of alterations.91 Hence, the existing human tissue gift legislation is 
not adequate to meet the special regulatory requirements of this area 
of tissue procurement. 
The existing regulations relating to disposal of abortuses are also 
not sufficiently adaptable to provide a comprehensive regulatory 
regime for the procurement of fetal tissue for transplantation. The 
regulations merely leave it up to the hospitals to dispose of the tissue 
according to the dictates of their internal policy guidelines. More 
specific legislative or regulatory directions which address issues such 
as informed consent to the use of fetal tissue, and which are cognizant 
of the potential exploitation of pregnant women and fetuses, are re-
quired. 
According to the MRC Guidelines: 
At this time, the legal status of embryos and fetuses is not well 
defined, nor is the social consensus. While issues of consent and 
autonomy may not therefore apply, clear ethical concerns arise 
from the unarguable fact that embryos and fetuses are human life 
forms. 92 
This uncertainty would suggest that these Guidelines also do not 
provide an adequate response to the unique ethical questions raised 
by the concept of fetal tissue transplantation. Furthermore, the 
Guidelines are directed primarily at research on embryos and in utero 
fetuses. Hence, they do not contemplate the procurement of tissue 
from dead fetuses. In addition, because fetal tissue transplantation is 
not currently supported through public funding, the Guidelines do 
not strictly apply.93 Clearly, there is a need in Canada, in the wake of 
increasing incursions into the realm of fetal tissue transplantations, to 
establish firm regulatory controls which can ensure that all parties to 
the procedure are properly protected. 
3. Regulation in Other Jurisdictions 
i. Australia 
According to the report of the Australian Medical Research Ethics 
Committee, it is acceptable to use aborted fetal tissue for research or 
therapy, as long as the fetus does not attain a gestational age of 20 
9! See for example, Morgan, supra note 6 at 297-301. 
92 Supra note 85 at 32. 
93 Supra note 14 at 133. 
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weeks and does not exceed 400g in weight. Research protocols must 
be approved by a properly constituted ethics committee, and the 
abortion procedure must be completely separate from the tissue pro-
curement process. Consent of the mother and, where practicable, the 
father, is required. The intending researcher is not permitted to ap-
proach the pregnant woman to solicit consent to the procurement of 
the aborted fetal tissue. 94 
ii. Britain 
Current British guidelines for fetal tissue research stipulate that the 
pregnant woman's consent to undergo an abortion must be kept sep-
arate from her consent to donate the resulting fetal tissue. No direct 
contact is allowed between the abortion clinics and the tissue re-
searchers,95 and there should be no financial reward for donating fetal 
tissue. 96 
iii. Sweden 
In Sweden, provision guidelines allow tissue to be taken only from 
dead fetuses. The pregnant woman must give her informed consent, 
and the decision to donate should not in any way affect the method 
or timing of abortion. 97 
iv. The United States 
In every state, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act allows the donation of 
fetal tissue or organs provided that there is documented parental con-
sent. 98 However, eight states have laws which prohibit the experi-
mental use of dead fetal tissue obtained from induced abortions.99 
The U.S. House of Representatives has also recently passed Bill H.R. 
2507 which requires, firstly, that a woman who has agreed to donate 
fetal tissue certify that she did not have an abortion with the intent to 
donate the tissue; and, secondly, that this certification be kept on file 
by researchers involved in fetal tissue research. These two require-
94 ]. Gunning, Human !VF, Embryo Research, Fetal Tissue for Research and 
Treatment, and Abortion: International Information (London: H.M.S.O., 1990) at 
13. 
95 Supra note 1 at 3. 
96 Supra note 10 at 1012. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Supra note 94 at 44. 
99 See, for example, Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, II. S. C. 510/ 12.1. 
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ments have been hotly contested, as they are viewed as an invasion of 
the woman's privacy, and a violation of her rights to autonomy and 
confidentiality. Ioo 
4. Proposed Model for Regulatory Control 
We are very conscious of the need to address the many 
ethical and social questions raised by fetal tissue use and to 
safeguard against the possible risks of coercion, commer-
cialization, and the promotion of abortion. IOI 
The serious ethical concerns raised by a discussion of fetal tissue 
transplantation indicate that some form of regulatory control of this 
procedure is needed. There are currently no directly applicable na-
tional guidelines or policy statements which sufficiently deal with the 
matter; nor is the existing legislation properly adaptable to meet the 
unique problems raised by fetal tissue transplantation. Hence, we 
cannot address all of the concerns raised by this issue by maintaining 
the status quo. It is possible to modify the existing human tissue gift 
legislation so that it can specifically include fetal tissue. However, the 
unique and complex ethical questions generated by a consideration of 
fetal tissue transplantation cannot be sufficiently addressed by such 
an amendment. 
Therefore, I propose that a new statute be enacted to deal with all 
matters relating to embryos, fetuses, and reproduction (that is, those 
issues dealt with by the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies). One section of this new statute would specifically ad-
dress the use of aborted fetal tissue for medical purposes. 
Consequently, there would be a number of provisions expressly 
dealing with the issue of fetal tissue transplantation. 
It is possible that such proposed legislation could be viewed as 
falling under either the federal or provincial legislative jurisdiction, as 
provided in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution .102 The legislators 
might choose to tie the subject matter of the statute to the creation of 
crimes under the federal Government's jurisdiction over criminal law, 
in subsection 91 (27) of the Constitution. Alternatively, the legislation 
could be framed so as to fall within the federal Government's residual 
100 W. Kearney, D. E. Vawter, & K. G. Gervais, "Fetal Tissue Research and the 
Misread Compromise" (1991) 21 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 7. 
101 Supra note 10 at 990. 
102 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3. 
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powers relating to peace, order and good government, in section 91 
of the Constitution. Either approach would allow for the creation of a 
federal regulatory scheme relating to fetal tissue transplantation, 
similar to that favoured by the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies.103 
A less controversial route is to frame the legislation in such a way 
as to ensure that it clearly falls within the provinces' jurisdiction over 
health, under the head of "property and civil rights" in subsection 
92(13) of the Constitution. Such provincial legislation would focus on 
the protection of relevant rights and interests, as opposed to the cre-
ation of penal sanctions. 
Specifically, the new legislation should set up restrictions which 
will protect all of the parties to the fetal tissue transplantation proce-
dure. A prominent section on consent should delineate the essential 
requirements for a free and informed consent. As with the Victoria 
General Hospital consent process, the pregnant woman should not be 
approached for the purpose of procuring the dead fetus' tissue until 
after she has consented to have an abortion. This is also consistent 
with the consent processes in both Australia and Britain. This ensures 
that abortion management is clearly separated from the procurement 
of fetal tissue. Unlike the Australian consent process, however, only 
the consent of the mother should be required (although I offer no 
opinion as to whether or not the father should have the right to con-
sent to the preceding abortion). 
As with the Australian consent process, neither the physicians nor 
the researchers involved in the ensuing transplantation operation 
should be permitted to solicit from the pregnant woman any consent 
to tissue procurement; rather, the pregnant woman should be ap-
proached by a neutral party, so as to protect the woman from coer-
cion. In addition, the pregnant woman should be prevented from 
designating the recipient of the fetal tissue, and the researchers should 
not be permitted to name the potential recipient of the tissue, if he or 
she is known. This, too, will help prevent coercion of the pregnant 
woman, and diminish any possibility of fetal tissue harvesting for 
friends and family members. 
Bernard Dickens suggests that the prevention of tissue designa-
tion can be approached by either criminal or non-criminal sanctions 
against prospective donors, or indirectly by regulation of health pro-
l03 Supra note 10. 
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fessionals or facilities. 104 I favour the latter as most pregnant women 
who elect to have abortions are in vulnerable positions. The pregnant 
woman therefore should not be punished when it is really those in 
positions of superiority, or those who owe her fiduciary obligations, 
who should be held responsible for coercing her into designating the 
recipient of her fetal tissue. Hence, no certification of ethical intent 
should be required, as in the proposed U.S. legislation. 
The transplantation procedure should be explained to the preg-
nant woman so that her voluntary decision is also informed. However, 
there should not be any need to explain the possibility of additional 
risk to the woman, as such risk should be non-existent. Since consent 
to donate cannot be solicited until after the woman has consented to 
a particular abortion procedure, the researchers will be unable to re-
quest a different, and perhaps more risky, abortion procedure which 
might produce more medically-useful fetal tissue. Consequently, the 
researchers and physicians involved in the transplantation procedure 
must be content with the type of abortion to which the woman has 
previously consented. Future fetuses should be protected through a 
prohibition on the sale of fetal tissue and products made from fetal 
tissue. This will ensure that a bio-commerce in fetal tissue does not 
develop. As well, there should be a prohibition on payment to a 
pregnant woman in exchange for aborted fetal tissue. This can help 
prevent both the establishment of a market in fetal tissue and the co-
ercion of pregnant women. 
Finally, the new legislation should include a provision directed at 
the recipient of the fetal tissue. The transplantation procedure should 
not be allowed to proceed until the treatment is fully explained to the 
recipient, and all material risks are disclosed. As well, there must be 
standards which ensure that a recipient is not coerced into receiving a 
fetal tissue transplant. The transplant operation therefore should not 
occur until both the pregnant woman, and the recipient of the fetal 
tissue, have given free and informed consent. 
The relevant part of this proposed legislation might take the fol-
lowing form: 105 
104 B. M. Dickens, "Legal Issues in Embryo and Fetal Tissue Research and 
Therapy" in Research Volumes of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies (Ottawa, 1992) 43. 
l05 For another variation, see supra note 48. 
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An Act Respecting Abortion, Embryo Research, and the Use of 
Fetal Tissue for Research and Treatment 
PartX 
Procurement and Use of Tissue from Therapeutically-Aborted 
Fetuses 
Consent by Donor 
1. (1) Any legally competent woman undergoing a therapeutic 
abortion may donate the aborted fetus or its tissues. Hereafter, 
any such legally competent woman who donates her aborted fetus 
shall be referred to as a "donor." 
(2) Informed consent, in writing, is required from a donor before 
her aborted fetus, or its tissues, may be procured and used for 
medical research or treatment. 
(3) Consent to the procurement and use of an aborted fetus, or 
its tissues, may not be solicited from a donor until after she has 
given free and informed consent, in writing, to the abortion pro-
cedure. 
(4) No person engaged in carrying out a transplantation proce-
dure under Part X of this Act shall be permitted to solicit consent 
to the procurement of an aborted fetus or its tissues. 
Prohibition Against Designation 
2. (1) No person shall request a donor to specifically designate the 
recipient of tissue donated under Part X of this Act. 
(2) No donor shall designate the recipient of tissue donated under 
Part X of this Act. 
(3) The name of the recipient of tissue donated under Part X of 
this Act shall not be disclosed to the donor. 
Prohibition Against Commercial Exchange or Payment 
3. (1) It shall be unlawful to knowingly engage in any sale or com-
mercial exchange of aborted fetuses or fetal tissue or products 
made from fetal tissue. 
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(2) It shall be unlawful to provide payment to any donor in ex-
change for the procurement and use of the aborted fetus or its tis-
sues. 
Consent of the Recipient 
4. No transplantation procedure under Part X of this Act shall pro-
ceed until the informed consent, in writing, of the recipient undergo-
ing such transplantation procedure has been obtained. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Legislation cannot resolve all of the problems in today's complex so-
ciety. However, the unique ethical concerns raised by an analysis of 
the issues relating to fetal tissue transplantation deserve the special at-
tention of legislators. New legislation should be drafted to regulate 
the procurement and use of tissue obtained from dead, aborted fe-
tuses. This new regulatory regime can fill the lacunae which currently 
exist in the law. The new enactment should address previously over-
looked issues, such as the requirement for voluntary, informed con-
sent from both the donating mother and the tissue recipient, avoid-
ance of coercion, and prohibitions on the commodification and 
commercialization of fetuses and fetal tissue. It is hoped that as the 
medical technology in this field of research continues to advance and 
improve, and that the regulation of such research may similarly ad-
vance and improve, thereby providing legal protection to all who 
might be affected by this contentious technological procedure. 
